Abstract: Annotation systems enable "value-adding" to digital resources by the attachment of additional data in the form of comments, explanations, references, reviews and other types of external, subjective remarks. They facilitate group discourse and capture collective intelligence by enabling communities to attach and share their views on particular data and documents accessible over the Web. Annotation systems vary greatly with regard to the types of content they can annotate, the extent of collaboration and sharing they allow and the communities which they serve. However many applications share the need to authenticate the source of annotations and restrict access to them -in order to protect intellectual property rights or personal privacy. This paper describes a secure, open source annotation system that we have developed that uses Shibboleth [1] and XACML [2] to identify and authenticate users and restrict access to annotations stored on an Annotea [3] server.
Introduction
Annotations have long been used as a a tool to facilitate collaborative scholarly discourse. They enable users to attach additional material such as comments, notes, queries, assessments, references to resources such as documents, images or datasets. When applied to digital resources shared via the Web, they provide a very powerful collaborative tool -enabling the easy capture and wide dissemination of individuals' and group opinions of particular digital resources. Currently available annotation systems vary widely with respect to the types of content they annotate, the extent of collaboration and sharing they allow and the communities which they serve [4] . Although they have been successfully applied to domains including education [5] , research, medicine [6] and neuroscience [7] in order to capture and exchange metadata, ideas, opinions and interpretations, evaluation of these applications indicates limitations in existing commercial and prototype systems. Current systems are limited by: lack of responsiveness, use of non-standard proprietary technologies; lack of authentication of the annotations' creator; limited search capabilities; lack of security mechanisms; inability to reply to/stagger annotations; asynchronous sharing only; support for limited media types; coarse granularity and unstructured annotations (single field, free text only). The main focus of the work described in this paper is to provide annotation tools for collaborators within eResearch environments -and particularly higher education environments. A critical requirement for such a domain is the need to be able to restrict access to annotations attached to a particular collection of digital resources -to a particular group of trusted colleagues -for reasons of privacy, confidentiality or protection of intellectual property. This is particularly important within eScience, where the annotation or interpretation of the raw document or data, is often more valuable than the target of the annotation. Also by providing researchers with a robust, reliable security infrastructure, they may be more willing to engage in the exchange of views and ideas -a key to successful inter-organizational collaboration. The security requirements for annotations involve two levels of protection:
• protecting the annotation server on which the annotations are stored, through some form of identity management and authentication; • authenticating and protecting the individual annotations through the specification of access policies that define permissable types of access (e.g, list, create, read, edit, delete) by individual users or user groups based on user attributes. Within this paper we describe an open source implementation of a secure annotation service that we have developed. Our implementation involves the combination and extension of a number of existing open source technologies that are based on open standards:
• Annotea -a Web-based annotation server developed by the W3C as part of the Semantic Web initiative [8] ; • Shibboleth -an Internet2 middleware initiative that enables identity management and secure access to Web resources shared amongst multiple organizations [1] ; • XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) -XML-based language for defining and enforcing access control policies [9] . The remainder of this paper describes in detail the secure annotation system that we have built. Section 2 describes previous related activities in the development of annotation systems and security mechanisms. Section 3 describes the overall architecture of our system and its main components. Section 4 illustrates the user interface and system functionality. Section 5 provides an evaluation of the system and describes future work. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion.
Background and Previous Work
Significant prior work has been carried out on both web-based annotation systems and on identity management and role-based access control. Rather than re-invent the wheel, we carried out an analysis of existing systems to determine if any currently available solutions satisfied our needs and hence could be integrated, refined or extended.
Existing Annotation systems and Annotea
A survey of current Web-based annotation systems [4] reveals that they vary in the way in which annotations may be attached, the way in which they are presented and in the access control mechanisms. Some systems are designed for private use only whilst others permit sharing amongst groups and/or public access. None of the surveyed systems provide the kinds of fine-grained access control mechanisms that is required by collaborative teams of scientists engaging in eResearch. Through earlier work [10] we identified Annotea [8] as an ideal approach for implementing an annotation server. Annotea is a Web-based annotation system that uses Resource Description Framework (RDF) [11] to model annotations as a set of statements or assertions made by the author. These annotations are then stored in a HTTP enabled server, which enables clients such as Annozilla [12] and Amaya [13] to query, update, post, delete and reply to annotations. Currently there are two publicly available implementations of annotation servers which use Annotea: Zope [10] and W3C Perllib [14] . Figure 1 illustrates the RDF annotation schema used to describe various properties of an annotation including its author, title, date of creation, body and context. A key strength of the Annotea protocol is that it uses open W3C standards such as RDF, XPointer, XLink and HTTP. By choosing to use RDF, Annotea makes it possible to easily adapt or extend the existing scheme to incorporate additional information (e.g. what type of annotation it is, its language, the type of resource it annotates, structured annotations). The use of machine-processable RDF descriptions also enables easier search, retrieval and linking of the annotations to related resources and services using semantic web technologies (e.g., OWL, SWRL). Annotea can also be easily extended to allow for the annotation of media types other than text e.g., images through the use of SVG [15] . Vannotea [16] uses a similar approach to extend Annotea to enable the annotation of videos. These applications and in particular the application of Vannotea to Indigenous Knowledge [17] clearly identified the need to further extend the Annotea server to enable fine-grained access control to annotations.
Identity Management and Shibboleth
Harris et. al. generated a comprehensive report describing access management (AM) systems used in the UK Higher Education sector [18] . The most prominent systems identified included: Microsoft's Passport, Liberty Alliance, WS-Security, PAPI, Athens and Shibboleth. Of the six systems, only three are targeted at the higher education domain, while the other three (Passport, Liberty Alliance and WS-Security) are primarily focused on business-centric solutions. At present in the UK, the major AM solution in higher education is Athens. Its key distinction is that it uses a single centralized database which maintains a list of Athens username/passwords for all users with accounts at participating institutions. 
XACML
As Lorch et al [9] explains, Shibboleth does not provide a dynamic and distributed approach to access control. XACML enables us to address these issues. XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup language) is an XML-based language used to describe general purpose access control policies as well as an access control decision request/response language [20] . XACML policies are expressed in XML and must conform to an XML schema that defines the language semantics. Policies are defined in a tree-like structure as a set of rules pertaining to a particular resource and subject. XACML also specifies the structure and syntax of the requests and the responses to these requests. Each request is composed of attributes associated with the requesting user, the resource being acted upon, the action being performed and environmental information. The response can be one of four specific types: Permit, Deny, Not Applicable, and Intermediate.
3 System Architecture and Implementation The annotation server within Figure 2 is part of the Shibboleth SP, and may be located on any of the organizations/universities that are part of the federation. Figure 2 illustrates a simplified view of a shibbolized annotea transaction. Firstly Shibboleth is responsible for authenticating a user and retrieving the users' attributes from the requestors IDP. These attributes are then passed on to the XACML module which generates an XACML request and retrieves the relevant policy from the repository to generate an XACML response. Finally this response is passed to the annotation server which based on the XACML response either proceeds with or denies the request.
Server-side
The Server side consists of four main architectural components: the Annotation and Policy server, XACML module; Shibboleth attributes and the Jena database.
The Annotation and Policy Server
The Annotea server (implemented using Java Servlets, hosted on a Tomcat server) has been extended to support the finegrained access policies in addition to the operations defined by Annotea (posting, querying, downloading, updating, replying and deletion of annotations). Figure 3 illustrates the extensions made to support policies (in red). The first extension is the unique creatorID property -which applies to the annotation as well as to the body and policy objects. The creatorID property is used when making decisions on delete and update operations -only the creator of a resource is permitted to modify or delete that resource. The other key extension is the policy object. Uniquely identified XACML policies are stored within the RDF repository, along with annotation bodies. Objects are linked to particular policies through their policy property -which is specified by a URL. This approach has the benefit of enabling multiple annotations to use the same policy. If a policy is modified, the changes will effect all those annotations associated with the policy.
XACML Module and Policies
This module is responsible for implementing the Role Based Access Control functionality and is based upon Sun's XACML implementation [2] . It makes decisions on whether a particular request is permitted based upon the role/attributes of the person making the request. The creation and reply of annotations is open to all users that are permitted to access the annotation server. Updating and deleting of objects are operations which are only available to the creator of the object. There are three types of actions permissible on annotations by users other than the creator:
• LIST -viewing of annotation metadata (e.g., author, creation date, language, etc. )
• READ -viewing of the annotation body.
• READ_POLICY -viewing of the annotation policy. Figure 4 illustrates an example policy and request. Each Policy consists of a set of Rules related to whether a specific operation is permitted by a particular Subject. The Subject is described by a set of attributes which identify the credentials of a particular user e.g. affiliation, role, etc. In Figure  4a , members of the Staff "Group" have an attribute eduPersonAffiliation equal to "staff". This is a relatively simple example. It is possible to define more complex groups based on multiple attributes. In the example, staff are permitted to perform all three operations on annotations whilst students are denied access to all three. Given the example policy in Figure 4a , the example request (in Figure 4b) -that a student to be permitted to read policy 123, will be denied. It is important to note that although XACML policies provide much more expressiveness than we provide, we have deliberately kept the user interface ( Figure 6 ) simple so that end users can create policies themselves.
Figure 4: (a) Example Policy and (b) Example Request
The XACML module is implemented through three steps. The first step involves gathering attributes about the requester from the requestor's IDP through Shibboleth's SAML assertions. Using these attributes, an XACML request is created -it specifies the action to be performed, the resource requested and the attributes of the requestor. The second step involves locating the policy associated with the resource being requested by querying the RDF repository for a policy with a given URL. Thirdly the retrieved policy is compared with the request and Sun's XACML implementation generates an XACML response specifying whether the request is permitted or denied.
Shibboleth (SAML) Attribute Assertions
The annotation server depends on Shibboleth to provide the necessary eduPerson attributes about a requestor, as provided by its origin site (Identity Provider). These attributes are used by the XACML module to make an access control decision. Shibboleth itself is a complex architecture and details are available from [22] . Each site which takes part in a Shibboleth federation may consist of either/both an origin (identity provider) and target (service provider). In terms of our annotation system, a user's attributes are provided by their origin (Identity Provider), which stores them in a directory service such as an LDAP server. The annotation server is hosted on the target site. The server is available to members of organizations that are part of the federation and have sufficient access privileges to the annotation server as defined by the host organization.
Jena Database
Jena [23] provides an API to an RDF repository and in the context of this system is responsible for enabling the storage and interfacing of data -including annotations, policies and annotation bodies, which are all stored in the repository as RDF instances. Jena itself sits on top of MySQL database which stores the RDF data as a relational database. The Jena API also enables us to search the annotations -via the creator, date, language and in_reply_to fields.
Client-side
The user's client side application is responsible for the user interface that enables: the retrieval and display of annotated web resources; display, search and browsing of annotations the creation, editing, deletion and attachment of annotations to Web resources; the creation, editing and attachment of access policies to annotations. The client also has to process and exchange information in compliance with the Annotea protocol. Although a number of client-side annotation tools exist for annotating Web resources (Amaya [13] , Annozilla [12] , and Vannotea [16] ) none of these provide an interface suitable for also specifying XACML access policies and attaching them to the annotations. Consequently we developed our own client-side application using .NET to allow the display and editing of annotations and policies.
The User Interface Figure 5: User Interface showing Sidebar with threaded replies and dialog box for creating annotations
For testing and illustrative purposes, we used the ePrints archive at the University of Queensland. Figure 5 shows the user interface after a user with authenticated access to the annotation server logs onto the system and retrieves a particular annotated publication. The annotations are displayed in the top left-hand frame, the details of a selected annotation are in the bottom left-hand frame and the publication is displayed in the right hand frame. Figure 5 also illustrates the user interface for creating and attaching an annotation. We have extended Annotea to support structured annotations that contain a number of fields including hyperlinks, files, free text or controlled vocabularies. Figure 6 shows the user interface we developed for defining groups and policies. Firstly it enables 'Groups' to be defined by sets of common attribute values. In Figure 6a , the group uq_members is defined as users with (eduPersonAffiliation = staff, eduPersonOrgUnitDN = dke and eduPersonOrgDN = itee) where the attributes are issued by uq.edu.au. The policy in Figure 6a has three groups -uq_members, monash_members and jcu_members. The second part of policy definition involves defining access rules for each of the groups. In Figure 6b , the Group jcu_members are permitted to List and Read annotations, but not Read Policy. This interface makes it easy for users to define new groups, modify/remove existing groups and define/modify policies. 
System Evaluation
To date, system evaluation has comprised thorough unit and system testing. This involved testing the creation, editing and deletion of (the complete set of possible) policies and annotations. We also tested policy enforcement by logging on as users with different attributes and modifying attributes directly in the LDAP directory. In all cases the annotation server behaved as expectedrestricting user access to annotations in compliance with the policies. However the testing phase did reveal a number of problematic issues. These included: Allowing the deletion and update of annotations can lead to 'hanging references' where replies refer to annotations which have been updated or deleted. The use of URLs to identify policies enables them to be re-used and applied to multiple annotations. However this may cause problems when a policy referred to by multiple annotations is updated/deleted.
Future Work
Aspects of this work that would benefit from further investigation include: -Thorough user evaluation: detailed usability studies are required to acquire user feedback and determine: functional requirements of different user groups; how intuitive, friendly and efficient the user interface is; and improvements, refinements and extensions to the system. -Reduced reliance on Shibboleth: approaches other than Shibboleth and the eduPerson profile will enable the annotation server to be used outside of the Higher Ed sector.
-Annotation of PDF files, database columns and spreadsheets: the popularity of publishing scholarly information in PDF format and storing scientific data in databases or spreadsheets (e.g., Excel) indicates an increasing demand to be able to annotate data in proprietary formats.
-Access policies based on document attributes: the current policies are dependent on user attributes. It would be interesting to investigate policies that are based on attributes of the digital resources or their annotations.
-Complex querying: the integration of SPARQL to allow more complex queries over the annotation server while enforcing access constraints.
-Web browser extension: although Annotea-compliant extensions exist for Web browsers, they do not provide support for policy definitions. It is necessary to either extend an existing Annotea plugin or develop a new extension.
-Post-processing of annotations: our current version can notify authors via RSS when replies are added to their annotations. Other examples include the Multivalent Browser [24] which can review and incorporate suggested changes within documents. Ontology-based annotations or the annotation metadata (author, institution, citations etc) could be used to process annotations and automatically classify or rank the annotations and resources.
-Scalability: further investigation is required to determine how the system performs as the number of annotations, access policies and users grows e.g., Sesame may be more efficient than Jena.
Conclusions
This paper describes a secure annotation service that we have developed by combining and extending a number of existing open source technologies. Secure, trusted annotation servers are required in many domains including telemedicine, higher education and collaborative eResearch. By providing clinicians and researchers with the necessary support for authenticating the source and protecting the confidentiality and intellectual property of their annotations, they will be more willing to share their views and engage in inter-organizational collaborations with trusted colleagues. Moreover, the modular design and interoperable technologies that we have adopted, makes it easy to quickly adapt the server to a variety of different media types, different domains and different communities.
